Price of Cigarettes Going Up Again in July 2018
The effect of excise revenue enhancement increases on cigarette prices in South Africa
Abstract
Introduction The effectiveness of excise tax increases as a tool for reducing tobacco consumption depends largely on how the tax increases impact the retail price. Nosotros estimate this relationship in South Africa for 2001–2015.
Information Statistics South Africa provided disaggregated cigarette price data, used in the calculation of the Consumers' Price Alphabetize. Data on the excise tax per cigarette were obtained from Budget Reviews prepared by the National Treasury of S Africa.
Methods Regression equations were estimated for each calendar month. The calendar month-on-month modify in cigarette prices in February through April was regressed against March'southward excise tax change to estimate the pass-through coefficient. For the other 9 months, the month-on-calendar month change in cigarette toll was regressed against monthly dummy variables to determine the size of the non-taxation-related price increase in each of these months. The analysis was performed in both nominal and real (inflation-adapted) terms.
Findings Expressed in real terms, the excise tax was undershifted. A R1.00 (one rand) increment in the excise tax is associated with an increase in the retail toll of cigarettes of R0.90 in the pre-2010 flow, and R0.49 in the post-2010 menses. In the pre-2010 period, the tobacco industry increased the retail price of cigarettes in July/Baronial, contained of the excise revenue enhancement increment. The discretionary July/August toll increases largely disappeared later on 2010, primarily because the market became more than competitive.
Decision The degree of excise revenue enhancement pass-through, and the magnitude of discretionary increases in cigarette prices, is significantly adamant by the competitive surroundings in the cigarette marketplace.
- Excise tax pass-through
- Industry pricing strategy
- Overshifting and undershifting the excise tax
- South Africa
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- Excise revenue enhancement laissez passer-through
- Industry pricing strategy
- Overshifting and undershifting the excise tax
- South Africa
Introduction
The effectiveness of excise revenue enhancement increases as a tool for reducing tobacco employ depends on how the revenue enhancement increase impacts the retail toll of the product.one People change their purchasing behavior in response to retail price changes, not in response to excise tax changes. Typically, smokers take no incentive to know the tax amount on cigarettes (and probably exercise non know the quantum of the tax), but they are made aware of the retail price at each purchase occasion. There is consensus in the literature that, despite the addictiveness of nicotine, an increment in tobacco prices does reduce tobacco consumption.i
An excise taxation increment typically increases the price of cigarettes. The magnitude of the cost increase depends on the degree to which the tax increase is passed through to consumers. The caste of pass-through thus determines the effectiveness of the excise revenue enhancement in reducing tobacco consumption (autonomously from the hypothetical cases in which need or supply is perfectly price-inelastic). For example, a fully passed-through tax increment is more effective in reducing tobacco consumption than a tax increase partially borne by the producer. This paper considers the dynamics of cigarette excise revenue enhancement pass-through in Southward Africa.
For many years, Southward Africa was regarded as a pioneer in tobacco control among low-income and center-income countries, peculiarly for its apply of excise taxes.2 Value-added tax (VAT) has been levied at 14% of the (ex-VAT) retail price since 1993. In 1994, excise taxes and VAT, combined, comprised 33% of the retail price of cigarettes. In that year, the authorities announced that it would target a total tax burden on cigarettes of l%, to be achieved within an unspecified number of years.3 In 1997, the government announced it had reached the target.3 The excise tax in Due south Africa is levied every bit a compatible specific tax. Between 1998 and 2005 the government annually adapted the excise tax to maintain the 50% total tax threshold. In 2006 the total revenue enhancement target was increased to 52% of the recommended retail toll of the most popular brand. Since 2006 the revenue enhancement authorities and the targeted tax percentage has remained unchanged.
British American Tobacco (BAT) is the dominant cigarette producer and distributor in South Africa. Before 2010 BAT's primary competitors were other multinationals (Philip Morris International, Nippon Tobacco International and Majestic Tobacco), but BAT was the unchallenged toll leader. Co-ordinate to Euromonitor, BAT had a 91% market share in 20054 and although its market place share has decreased somewhat subsequently, it is nevertheless above 80%.5 BAT had much pricing ability to substantially increase the net-of-tax toll of cigarettes. Whereas the real (aggrandizement-adapted) net-of-tax price of cigarettes remained broadly constant (and even decreased slightly) between the early 1960s and early 1990s, it doubled between 1994 and 2010. This, together with a fivefold increase in the real excise tax, resulted in a near-tripling of existent cigarette retail prices between 1994 and 2010. The rapid increase in cigarette prices, together with sluggish economic growth, meant that cigarettes became substantially less affordable.6 Because of these price increases and other factors, including tobacco control interventions, smoking prevalence decreased from approximately a third to less than a fifth between 1994 and 2012.2 7
In 2010 the S African cigarette market inverse substantially. The high profits earned by BAT and other multinationals attracted many small-scale cigarette manufacturers and distributors, who undermined the established firms. The new entrants were primarily competing in the low-toll segment, selling at prices essentially lower than the economic system brands sold by the incumbents. At that place was as well a substantial increase in the illicit market that twelvemonth.8
This paper estimates the pass-through of cigarette excise taxes before and after 2010 in South Africa. Southward Africa is an important example for other countries, since it was i of the showtime center-income countries to use excise revenue enhancement increases equally a tobacco command tool. The newspaper adds to the literature on excise revenue enhancement pass-through,9–xv only, crucially, considers a structural break in the industry's pricing reaction to excise taxation increases.
Information
This paper uses monthly cigarette cost data collected past Statistics South Africa from Dec 2001 to December 2005 and from January 2008 to December 2015. Statistics Due south Africa provided us the data on request. The gap in the data is due to a change in the data capturing arrangement at Statistics South Africa, when the price data were 'lost'. The cost information are used to compile the Consumers' Toll Index, and is typically nerveless in the first 2 weeks of each calendar month. The Consumers' Price Alphabetize (CPI) is published effectually the 20th of the post-obit month. All prices refer to packs of 20 cigarettes. Each of the 97 948 observations (over 145 months) contains (1) the brand, (2) the cost and (3) the geographical region of the outlet (the proper name of a city, town, municipality or a defined rural/urban area inside a town). In the sample there are 51 dissimilar brands and 77 regions, corresponding to the sampling frame used past Statistics S Africa.
For each calendar month, an boilerplate price was calculated across outlets for each make-region combination, subject field to in that location beingness at least three observations for that make in that month (irrespective of region). A total of 1 626 observations (1.7%) was excluded from the analysis because they did not meet this requirement. Where a price observation deviated by more than three standard deviations or by more 50% from the mean price for the associated make-month combination, the observation was dropped on the grounds that it was either not representative of that brand-calendar month combination, or an mistake. As a result 889 observations (0.9%) were excluded. Calendar month-on-calendar month differences of these brand-region average prices were calculated for each month, which gave united states of america a total of 32 836 observations for apply in the regressions. The observations used in the regressions were based on an boilerplate of 2.9 raw observations (ie, (97 948–1 626–889)/32 836).
Statistics South Africa informed the authors that the same retail outlets are surveyed from month to calendar month. Where this was not possible (eg, an outlet airtight down), they would sample a like retail outlet from that region in order to go along the sampling frame as consequent equally possible over time.
We used multiple almanac Budget Reviews, prepared past the National Treasury of South Africa, to obtain the excise tax per pack of cigarettes, which is levied as a uniform specific taxation. The excise taxation is adjusted in late Feb each year. The largest nominal excise taxation increase in the sample was R1.24 in 2010 (from R7.70 to R8.94), while the smallest was R0.34 in 2002 (from R3.17 to R3.51). To synchronie the revenue enhancement changes with the toll changes, the tax increment is reflected in March, because past the time the excise revenue enhancement increment is announced, the price survey in February is already completed.
We performed the assay in both nominal and existent terms. Results are presented for both nominal and real prices since there is no a priori reason for a similar magnitude of pass through when calendar month-to-month variations in general (all-CPI) inflation rates are corrected for. For the analysis in real terms, the effect of inflation is removed past dividing all price and taxation data by the appropriate Consumers' Cost Index (base Dec 2012). The South Africa currency is rand (R). The value of the currency fluctuated over the period of assay, but averaged near U.s.a.$0.x per R.
Thousandethodology
The study aims to estimate the extent to which the cigarette retail prices change in response to an excise tax change. To maintain their per-pack profit, and property costs constant, a R1 increase in the excise taxation would force firms to increase the retail price past R1.xiv (because 14% VAT is levied on the excise tax as well). The tax increase does not obligate firms to raise prices past R1.14 immediately, or even at all. The taxation increment could exist passed through over several months. The degree to which the business firm is able to pass through the tax increment is influenced by the degree of market competition and individual firms' discretion.
In its simplest form, i would regress the change in the boilerplate retail cost of brand i in region j in March (ie, 
) on the change in the excise tax in March (ie, ΔTMarch ). The coefficient on ΔTMarch indicates by how much the retail price of cigarettes increases in response to a one unit increase in the excise tax. The magnitude of this pass-through coefficient β allows 1 to determine whether the tax is contemporaneously overshifted (β>1.14), undershifted (β<1.14) or fully passed through (β=one.fourteen). The split occurs atβ=1.14, rather than at β=1, because the excise taxation is subject to VAT (14%).
Tobacco companies could pre-emptively enhance the cost of cigarettes (ie, before the tax increase is announced), or delay the price increment for competitive or other reasons. We presume that, other than the contemporaneous effect, the tax increase influences the price i calendar month on either side of March. The decision to use this fourth dimension horizon was driven by (1) a preliminary empirical analysis of the data at hand and (ii) a literature (not limited to simply tobacco) that indicates that the full touch of a tax increase on the price typically happens within 3 months.16–eighteen
For each of the monthly price changes in February, March and April, we judge the following regression equation:
(1)
where t denotes the month (Feb, March and April for the pre-emptive, contemporaneous and delayed price changes, respectively), y the yr, p the period (pre-2010 or post-2010) and εyt the idiosyncratic fault term.
For the other 9 months of the year, we assume that whatever toll changes are discretionary, determined by the strategic prerogatives of the tobacco industry. For each of these months, nosotros estimate the post-obit regression equation:
(ii)
where t denotes the calendar month (May through January), is a dummy variable=ane if the month is t and =0 otherwise, y denotes the year, p denotes the period (pre-2010 or postal service-2010) and εyt is an idiosyncratic mistake term.
The β coefficients in equation (one) are pass-through coefficients, while the δ coefficients in equation (two) evidence the month-on-calendar month price increase, on average, in the month to which information technology refers.
All regressions are estimated by weighted least squares (WLS), with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, using Stata version 12. We use WLS, rather than ordinary least squares, to requite appropriately more weight in our regressions to a make-region boilerplate price that is comprised of a larger number of individual toll observations than other make-region average prices. We present the results first in nominal terms and and so in real terms.
The model is parsimonious, in that the pass-through coefficients are based solely on the revenue enhancement changes and the model does non control for an underlying tendency in the price, or for changes in the costs of product. Not controlling for changes in the price of production could bias the pass-through coefficients. In particular, if the price increment in February, March and April is the issue of both excise revenue enhancement and product price increases, the pass-through coefficient will exist biased upwardly, because the affect of the price increment on the price increase will be wrongly attributed to the tax change. Given South Africa's moderately inflationary environment (averaging 5.viii% between Dec 2001 and December 2015), it seems likely that nominal per-cigarette cost of production has increased. As such, the laissez passer-through coefficients obtained in this specification are probably biased upwards and should therefore exist considered upper limits.
In the specification in real terms, the pass-through coefficients volition exist biased upward only if the real costs of product were increasing (ie, the nominal costs of producing cigarettes were increasing more than rapidly than the inflation rate). If the real costs of product were decreasing, the pass-through coefficients would be biased down. The fact that we cannot control for changes in the cost of production, is a drawback of this study. The tobacco manufacture is not obliged to publish such costs, which are regarded as confidential. The tobacco industry certainly has no incentive to provide them to the authors. Some published studies, especially those that apply industry information, command for costs,14–xvi 19–21 but others exercise not.22–26
The study assumes that wholesale and retail margins have remained abiding over time. While we practise not have data to test this assumption, it seems unlikely that the margins accept increased over time because they are currently very low (typically around 10%). Competition betwixt retailers is fierce, putting pressure on retail margins. Competition betwixt the large cigarette manufacturers is limited, allowing them to push button up prices. We are confident that retail cost increases are influenced more by changes in the ex-factory price charged by cigarette manufacturers, than past wholesalers' or retailers' margins.
Results
Graphical analysis
Effigy 1 presents the monthly weighted boilerplate nominal price of a pack of cigarettes for the period December 2001 to December 2015, barring a 2-year gap in 2006 and 2007, and the nominal excise revenue enhancement amount per pack over the same period. The increase in the nominal price of cigarettes is near-monotone, merely at that place are definite steps around March and, less-pronounced, effectually July and August. The March toll increment corresponds to the excise tax increment, just the cost increase in July/August seems to be discretionary.
Effective excise tax policy considers changes in the real excise tax, rather than changes in the nominal excise taxation.27 In figure two we present the boilerplate cost and excise taxation on cigarettes in real terms. The nominal excise tax increases monotonically. In dissimilarity, the real excise tax has a jagged shape; it increases each March just slowly erodes over the course of the year under the influence of aggrandizement.
Effigy 2 appears to point a structural suspension in cigarette prices and taxes in April 2010. Between December 2001 and April 2010 the real toll and the real excise taxation on cigarettes increased past 64% and 71%, respectively. In contrast, between April 2010 and December 2015, the real price and real excise revenue enhancement remained broadly constant. We performed Chow tests to test formally for a structural interruption in cigarette pricing in April 2010. If there was no structural suspension, each population pass-through coefficient and monthly consequence would be the same later on April 2010 every bit information technology was before April 2010. Nosotros find strong evidence that this is not the example. In item, the contemporaneous laissez passer-through estimates differ significantly before and after April 2010 (p<0.001 for the Chow tests on nominal and existent information). Furthermore, the 9-monthly effects (May through December) differ significantly before and subsequently April 2010 (p<0.05 for all months in both nominal and real terms). These results give strong statistical support to our claim that there was a structural break in cigarette pricing in Apr 2010. Within this context, the empirical work considers two periods: December 2001 to March 2010 and April 2010 to December 2015.
Estimating the pass-through coefficients
Analysis in nominal terms
Tabular array 1 presents the regression results of equation (1) for February, March and April, and equation (two) for the other 9 months, where the price and excise revenue enhancement are expressed in nominal terms, for both pre-2010 and post-2010.
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Table 1
Pass-through coefficients (Feb to April) and monthly effects, nominal prices
The contemporaneous pass-through coefficient is 1.21 (95% CI 1.eighteen to i.25) for pre-2010 and 1.11 (95% CI one.06 to 1.15) for mail service-2010. Thus, a R1 increase in the excise tax, appear in the latter part of February, was associated, on average, with a R1.21 price increase in March before 2010 and a R1.11 price increment afterward 2010.
The nominal tax increment is contemporaneously overshifted pre-2010, since the 95% CI lies in a higher place 1.14 (the pass-through coefficient that indicates full pass-through). In the post-2010 menstruation nosotros cannot reject the zero hypothesis that the nominal tax increment is contemporaneously fully passed through, since 1.xiv is included in the 95% CI.
There is practically no prove that the tobacco manufacture pre-emptively raises the price of cigarettes in the month before the tax increase, given the pocket-size, albeit pregnant, laissez passer-through coefficient (0.04) for February pre-2010, and the insignificant laissez passer-through coefficient post-2010. At that place is some evidence for a 1-month delayed pass-through effect, with pass-through coefficients of 0.13 pre-2010 and 0.12 post-2010.
The laissez passer-through in the 'three-month window' is the sum of the pass-through coefficients in February, March and April. This gives an indication of the 'long-term' impact of the excise tax change on the toll, although we acknowledge that this 'three-calendar month window' is rather arbitrary. For pre-2010, the 3-month pass-through is 1.38 (95% CI 1.34 to one.42) and for mail service-2010 it is 1.25 (95% CI 1.19 to 1.31). Thus, the tax increase is overshifted in both periods. However, recalling that the laissez passer-through coefficients based on nominal prices and excise taxes are likely to be biased upwards, this result is treated with circumspection.
The coefficients for May through January are not laissez passer-through coefficients, simply point the calendar month-on-month average increment in the nominal toll of cigarettes, expressed in rand per pack. For example, the coefficient for May in the pre-2010 period (0.04) indicates that the nominal price of cigarettes increased past an average of R0.04 per pack in May in that period.
With the exception of July, Baronial and September, the monthly nominal price increases were extremely small, in both pre-2010 and post-2010 periods, implying that nominal cigarette prices were largely kept unchanged in those months.
Pre-2010, nominal cigarette prices increased sharply in July (average of R0.33) and Baronial (boilerplate of R0.94), which, independent of the revenue enhancement-induced toll increase in March, represents an 8.1% increase in the average existent price (for the 2 months combined) in the 2001–2010 period. Post-2010, the July and August price increases were miniscule in comparison (R0.11 and R0.fifteen).
Analysis in real terms
Table 2 presents the same regression equation every bit table ane, simply the analysis is performed in real terms. All nominal prices and taxes, in level terms, were deflated by the monthly all-state CPI to requite constant December 2012 prices, from which the kickoff differences were obtained. This model is likely to yield more than realistic pass-through coefficients and non-tax-related monthly furnishings, because it assumes that nominal costs of production increase in line with inflation, rather than staying constant. In this specification, all pass-through coefficients and month effects are smaller than those presented in tabular array ane.
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Table 2
Pass-through coefficients (February to April) and monthly furnishings, real prices
For pre-2010, the contemporaneous pass-through coefficient is i.06 (95% CI one.02 to one.ten), and the long-run pass-through coefficient is 0.90 (95% CI 0.85 to 0.95). For post-2010 the contemporaneous laissez passer-through coefficient is 0.75 (95% CI 0.seventy to 0.80) and the long-run pass-through coefficient is 0.49 (95% CI 0.42 to 0.56). These results strongly propose that the excise tax increases, expressed in existent terms, were undershifted in both periods, but that the tax was increasingly undershifted in the mail-2010 flow.
The price increases in the other 9 months are specified to not be related to the March tax increment. Iv of the 9 months pre-2010 and seven of the 9 months post-2010 had negative monthly effects. The nominal prices in those months were generally unchanged, but the existent cost was eroded by inflation. In the pre-2010 period in that location was a sizeable real price increase in July (R0.14 in abiding December 2012 prices) and August (R1.04). Post-2010 the July real toll outcome became negative, while the August and September real price effects were modestly positive.
The sum of the 9-monthly coefficients is R1.28 pre-2010 and negative R0.32 post-2010. Thus, other than the tax-related price changes, there was a substantial (boilerplate of five.vii% per annum) increase in the real price of cigarettes during the course of the year pre-2010, and a modest (boilerplate of ane.1% per annum) decrease in the real price during the class of the yr post-2010.
Discussion
As one of the start middle-income countries to use excise tax increases every bit a tobacco control tool, Due south Africa has attracted much attention from the tobacco command community in the past two decades.ii 28 29 The effectiveness of excise tax increases to reduce tobacco consumption depends crucially on how it impacts the retail price. In this paper nosotros used a large data set up of cigarette prices, collected by Statistics South Africa, to examine this relationship between 2001 and 2015.
Before 2010 there were two sizeable retail price increases each year, namely in March and July/August. Expressed in real terms, the excise tax was slightly undershifted in March, meaning that the industry bore a small proportion of the tax increment. As a issue, the internet-of-revenue enhancement price decreased in March. In July and/or Baronial the tobacco industry substantially increased the retail price of cigarettes, more than than compensating for the drop in the net-of-revenue enhancement price in March.
The combined outcome of the tax-induced price increase in March and the discretionary manufacture-driven price increase in July/August was to substantially heighten the real retail cost of cigarettes before 2010. In fact, between 1994 and 2010, of all xxx consumer appurtenances and services monitored by Statistics South Africa, cigarettes experienced the largest price increases.
The situation changed dramatically in 2010. Whereas the excise tax was slightly undershifted earlier 2010, information technology was substantially undershifted after 2010. Besides, whereas discretionary price increases by the tobacco industry raised the real price of cigarettes before 2010, the tobacco industry was unable to exercise this later on 2010. Even though there were modest nominal discretionary price increases after 2010, in real terms they were negative because of the eroding effect of inflation.
1 could argue that information technology is arbitrary to accredit the February to April price increases to the March taxation increase, merely the other months' price increases to the tobacco industry'due south pricing strategy. If 1 were to take the view that all price increases are related to the excise tax increment, and so one would conclude that the excise tax was overshifted before 2010, merely was however undershifted in the subsequent period.
The literature on tobacco tax laissez passer-through is limited and is focused primarily on the USA.9–xv Most of these studies find that excise taxes are overshifted. Our results are more than nuanced. Our preferred results suggest that there is no bear witness to indicate that excise taxes are overshifted, although if one takes the view that all price changes can be attributed to the excise revenue enhancement increase, there was substantial overshifting in the catamenia prior to 2010. Excise taxes are substantially undershifted in the postal service-2010 period.
Pre-2010, the tobacco industry aggressively raised the retail price in July/Baronial, enhancing its turnover and overall profitability, and more making up for the loss of profit due to the undershifting of the revenue enhancement increase in March. The very large profits earned by the large tobacco companies, despite a challenging regulatory and legislative environment, attracted a number of aggressive cigarette manufacturers into the market towards the stop of the starting time decade of the 21st century. Some of these manufacturers were legal, some were not. The presence of low-price cigarettes dramatically inverse the cigarette marketplace. Previously, the multinational incumbents had been able to exploit their (near-)monopoly ability, merely this was no longer possible after 2010. It became increasingly difficult to pass excise revenue enhancement increases onto the consumer. A substantially larger proportion of the revenue enhancement increase was thus borne past cigarette producers.
From a tobacco control perspective, the developments since 2010 take been unfortunate. Excise tax increases have become less effective in decreasing tobacco consumption, considering the excise tax pass-through is lower than before 2010. Furthermore, the competitive surroundings has changed, with the tobacco manufacture less able to impose discretionary price increases on its customers. Before 2010, the discretionary price increases made cigarettes less affordable. Since 2010, that support for tobacco control has disappeared.
To achieve the same per centum increase in the retail cost, the government has to increase the excise tax by a larger amount than in the past. From a fiscal perspective, that would be beneficial, considering a larger increase in the excise tax per cigarette would outcome in more tax revenues. The government would have to overcome the industry's resistance and its claims that excise tax increases will increment illicit trade.28 With sufficient political volition, South Africa can revitalise the single almost important tool to rejuvenate its flagging tobacco control strategy.
What this paper adds
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This paper considers the relationship betwixt changes in the excise tax and changes in the retail cost in Due south Africa between 2001 and 2015. Like in many other countries, the cigarette manufacturing industry in South Africa is highly full-bodied, giving it much pricing power. Prior to 2010 the industry increased the retail toll of cigarettes twice a twelvemonth: in March in response to the excise tax increase, and in July/August largely independent of the price.
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The very loftier cyberspace-of-revenue enhancement prices earned by the incumbent firms attracted competitors to the market, which competed largely on cost. The increased levels of competition reduced the power of firms to pass through the tax increases and raise the retail cost. Since 2010 the excise tax increases take been undershifted.
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S Africa'southward experience indicates that tobacco companies' power to pass through the excise tax is constrained by the caste of contest in the market. This has implications for the effectiveness of excise tax increases as a tobacco command tool.
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